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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN AVIATION CASE LAW
By

MIICHAEL

R.

GALLAGHER* AND ALTON L. STEPHENS**

I. INTRODUCTION

T

HIS ARTICLE is a survey of aviation cases decided in 1977.
Its purpose is to acquaint the reader with a variety of cases
spanning the spectrum of aviation law and which may be of some
practical interest to attorneys; it is not intended to be a comprehensive treatment of any of the specific aspects of aviation law
presented. The cases discussed below fall into six general categories:
1. products liability;
2. pilots' negligence;
3. air carriers' liability to passengers for personal injury or
property damage under the contract of carriage, applicable
tariffs and the Warsaw Convention;
4. air carriers' liability to passengers for "overbooking";
5. the necessity, or lack thereof, of a causal relation between
exclusions in aviation insurance policies and a claimed loss
for which coverage is denied; and
6. miscellaneous.
These aviation law topics are representative of those addressed
by federal and state courts during 1977. Obviously, not every
significant case or topic is considered in this paper, but an effort
has been made to include cases with practical significance to most
attorneys whose practice includes aviation matters.
While many of the cases included here represent a change in
direction or recognize a trend or resolve issues of first impression,
many are consistent with earlier cases and are included because
they confirm earlier positions or are simply interesting; some cases
* J.D., Univ. of Mich., Attorney at Law, Cleveland, Ohio.
** J.D., Northern Ky. St. Univ., Attorney at Law, Cleveland, Ohio.
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are included only because they represent diametrically opposed
resolutions of the same issue. Altogether, we have selected some
thirty-one cases for discussion.
II. PRODUCTS LIABILITY

A seller of a product is strictly liable in tort for personal injury
or property damage resulting from the use of his product, if the
product was unreasonably dangerous and in a defective condition
at the time of sale.' It is; widely recognized that misuse of the
product is a defense to a strict liability action, provided the misuse
is unforeseeable! Usually whether a particular misuse is unforeseeable is a question of fact, but in Kay v. Cessna Aircraft Co.,"
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held as a matter
of law that plaintiff's decedent, the pilot of a Cessna Model 337
"push-me/pull-me" aircraft, had unforeseeably misused the aircraft by failing to follow operating instructions in the owner's
manual. The instructions, if followed, would have alerted him to
the fact that the rear engine had failed before he commenced his
fatal takeoff attempt. Plaintiff's theories of recovery were that
Cessna's instructions were inadequate or, in the alternative, that
even if adequate, failure to comply with them was a foreseeable
misuse of the aircraft. The court allowed that the instructions
could have been more clearly drafted, but held that compliance
with them would have averted the accident and that the decedent
pilot's failure to perform the indicated pre-takeoff procedures was
not reasonably foreseeable to Cessna. The court thereupon affirmed a judgment notwithstanding the verdict entered by the
trail court in Cessna's favor.
While the issue was not addressed by the court in Kay v.
Cessna, it could have just as easily been held that the decedent
pilot's conduct was contributory negligence as a matter of law.
It seems to be a generally accepted proposition that contributory
negligence is no defense to a strict liability claim unless such
negligence is the sole proximate cause of the loss. In fact, contributory negligence is a defense to strict liability claims unless
I RESTATEMENT

[SECOND] OF TORTS,

§ 402A

(1965).

2See, e.g., 63 AM. JuR. 2d Products Liability S§ 52, 136 (1972).

3 548 F.2d 1370 (9th Cir. 1977).
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"such negligence consists merely in a failure to discover the defect
in the product, or to guard against the possibility of its existence,'"
regardless of whether it is the sole proximate cause. In Kay v.
Cessna, the pilot was negligent not because he failed to discover
a defect, but because he failed to exercise ordinary care for his
own sofety in his manner of operating the aircraft.'
In order to prevail under a strict liability theory, Section 402A of
the Restatement (Second) of Torts, adopted by most jurisdictions
recognizing the strict liability in tort doctrine, requires one to prove,
among other things, that the offending product was "unreasonably
dangerous." Most courts enforce this requirement,' although some
have eliminated it." The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth
Circuit had occasion to consider the question in Rigby v. Beech
Aircraft Corp.,' and held that the trial court did not err in instructing the jury that any defect in the subject Beech Baron aircraft
had to render it "unreasonably dangerous" before Beech could be
held liable for wrongful death, personal injuries and destruction of
the aircraft. Defects in design and construction were alleged to
have led to fuel starvation and the crash of the aircraft. The district court, sitting in Utah, based its decision on Utah law. Since
Utah had neither adopted nor rejected the doctrine of strict liability in tort, the court was required to determine the probable
resolution of the issues should they be litigated in state courts. In
upholding the trial court's decision to charge on the "unreasonably
dangerous" requirement, the court observed that cases eliminating
the requirement are against the weight of authority," and held that
if faced with the same question, the Utah state courts would require proof that the aircraft was "unreasonably dangerous" as a
prerequisite to Beech's liability. The court thereupon affirmed the
trial court's entry of judgment for defendant Beech Aircraft Corporation.
4
RESTATEMENT [SECOND] OF TORTS, § 402A, comment n (1965).
' Cf. West v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 336 So. 2d 80 (Fla. 1976); Butaud v.
Suburban Marine, 555 P.2d 42 (Alas. 1976); Hoelter v. Mohawk Service, Inc.,
365 A.2d 1064 (Conn. 1976).
'63 AM. JUR. 2d Products Liability S 129 (1972).
' See, e.g., Anderson v. Fairchild Hiller Corp., 358 F. Supp. 976 (D. Alas.
1973); Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corp., 8 Cal. 3d 121, 501 P.2d 1153, 104 Cal. Rptr.
433 (Cal. 1972); Glass v. Ford Motor Co., 304 A.2d 562 (N.J. 1973).
'548 F.2d 288 (10th Cir. 1977).
'Id. at 291.
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The California Supreme Court case of Barker v. Lull Engineering Co.,'" decided in January, 1978, although involving a high lift
loader, deserves special comment because of the effect it will undoubtedly have on the liability of aircraft manufacturers in California and in other jurisdictions rejecting the "unreasonably
dangerous" requirement. The Barker case analyzed the basis of
liability for design defect, and held that a product is defective in
design either (1) if the product has failed to perform as safely as
an ordinary consumer would expect when used in an intended or
reasonably foreseeable manner or (2) if the benefits of the challenged design are outweighed by the risk of danger inherent in such
design. The court clearly states that once the plaintiff proves that
the product's design proximately caused his injury, then the burden
shifts to the defendant manufacturer to prove that, on balance, the
benefits of the challenged design outweighed the risks of the design.
The strict liability doctrine as set forth in Restatement (Second)
Torts, Section 402A, purports to apply only to sellers of an offending product; Sections 407 and 408 address the question of a lessor's
liability to users of a leased product, in terms of the "dangerousness" of the product and the lessor's negligence. But a substantial
number of courts have imposed Section 402A strict liability on
lessors of defective products." A recent case in the aviation context
is Rudisaile v. Hawk Aviation, Inc." Plaintiff's decedent leased
from defendants an aircraft from which defendant (a commercial
lessor of aircraft) had drained the oil without replacing it. The
decedent did not check the oil level prior to takeoff. Shortly after
takeoff, the engine failed resulting in the crash of the aircraft and
decedent's death. The New Mexico court, relying on the New
Mexico Supreme Court case of Stang v. Hertz," held that Section
402A strict liability principles governed defendant's liability. The
decedent's asserted contributory negligence in failing to check the
oil level was therefore not available as an affirmative defense, and
plaintiff prevailed. The Rudisaile case follows Stang v. Hertz without discussing the merits of applying the strict liability doctrine
1020 Cal. 3d 413, 573 P.2d 443, 143 Cal. Rptr. 225 (1978).
"Annot., 52 ALR 3d 121 (1973).
"14 Av. Cas. 17,713 (N.M. Dist. Ct. 1977).
1383 N.M. 730, 497 P.2d 732 (1972).

1978]

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

to lessors. This and its status as a trial court decision diminish its
significance.
An interesting products liability question is whether a contractual
disclaimer of warranty (i.e., an "as is" sale) can operate to absolve
the seller of strict liability in tort. In Mid-Continent Aircraft Corp.
v. Curry County Spraying Service, Inc., " the Texas Court of Civil
Appeals had occasion to consider the question as one of first impression. One Robert Hawkins, an FAA certificated engine
mechanic, performed a major overhaul on a Piper Pawnee agricultural aircraft owned by Bobby Shivers. Hawkins made a test
flight after completing the work, and duly certified the engine to
be in airworthy condition. Shivers later sold the aircraft "as is"
to defendant-appellant Mid-Continent Aircraft Corporation. Plaintiff-Appellee, Curry County Spraying Service, then purchased the
aircraft from Mid-Continent, with knowledge that the aircraft had
been purchased by Mid-Continent from Shivers, that MidContinent had not performed any work on the engine and that
Mid-Continent was selling the aircraft in the same condition as it
was purchased from Shivers. Shortly after Curry purchased the
aircraft, the engine quit in flight. Curry County Spraying brought
an action for property damage to the aircraft and for loss of its
use against Mid-Continent, Shivers, and Hawkins.
The theories of recovery were based on negligence, breach of
implied warranty, and strict liability in tort. The trial court found
that the engine was in an unreasonably dangerous and defective
condition at the time of the sale to Curry, the defect being the
absence of a crankshaft gear bolt lock plate and arising as the result
of Hawkins' sole negligence. Shivers and Mid-Continent argued
that the "as is" nature of their sale contracts exempted them from
liability under both the implied warranty and strict liability
theories. The court agreed with respect to the implied warranty
theory, but held that Mid-Continent and Shivers were liable to
Curry under the strict liability theory, for both economic loss (i.e.,
lose of use) and physical damage to the aircraft itself. (Economic
loss is not an item of damage enumerated in Section 402A.)
The court observed first that under "solidly established" Texas
law, "privity of contract is required before one may recover for
' 553 S.W.2d 935 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1977), rev'd, 21 Tex. S. Ct.
J. 481 (July 12, 1978), noted, 44 J. AIR L. & COM. 207 (1978).
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an economic loss--e.g., loss of use of the product, loss of bargain
-and, therefore, the law of sales rather than the rule of strict
liability applies [citations omitted]."' As a result, the "as is" nature
of the sale would have been sufficient to exclude liability for
economic loss, but the issue was foreclosed because it was not
raised on appeal.
The court next considered the question of whether Curry's
claim for physical damage to the aircraft itself was to be governed
solely by the law of sales or whether the strict liability doctrine also
applied. The court commented:
Evident from the development of the law is that the Uniform
Commercial Code (contract) law and the Restatement (Second)
of Torts § 402A (tort) rule of strict liability co-exist in Texas
to serve different functions. Code law, whose statutory language
makes no reference to tort law in connection with products liability, concerns itself with the quality of product by establishing
standards of merchantability and fitness for a particular purpose.
The rule announced by § 402A, accompanied by comment n stating that the rule is not governed by the provisions of the Uniform
Commercial Code, concerns itself with safety standards by imposing strict liability upon one who sells an unreasonably dangerous
product which causes physical harm. The considerationssupporting
either of the principles are not affected by the considerationsunderlying the other, and the standardsof quality of a product, with the
attendant risk of the bargain, are entirely distinct from its standards of safety, with a possible unreasonable risk of harm. It follows
that a violation of the standardsof safety which results in physical
harm to the unreasonably dangerous product itself subjects the
seller to the tort rule of strict liability. This rule has been pro-

claimed in other jurisdictions."
The court then came directly to grips with the issue of what
effect, if any, the "as! is" language of the sales contract had upon
Mid-Continent's strict liability to Curry, observing:
[W]e see no sound reason why knowledgeable parties of equal
bargaining strength should not also be free, in negotiating the sale
and purchase of a secondhand product, to define their scope of
responsibility for physical harm to the product itself. Agreements
between the buyer and the seller to limit or exonerate the seller's
tort liability for product defects are accorded validity elsewhere."
"553

S.W.2d at 939.
at 940 (emphasis added).
"Id. at 941.
'6Id.
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The court went on to hold that since there was no explicit agreement exonerating Mid-Continent from strict tort liability to Curry,
Mid-Continent was strictly liable to Curry for the physical damage to the aircraft. There was no personal injury claim in MidContinent v. Curry, and it is therefore silent on the issue of whether
a seller can exculpate himself from strict liability in tort for personal injury suffered by a user or consumer with whom he has
privity of contract.
A well-reasoned dissent argued that physical harm to a product
itself, resulting from a defect in the product, is essentially an unfulfilled commercial expectation and does not come within the
policy justification for § 402A strict liability."
Another case dealing with the kind of harm encompassed within
the doctrine of strict liability in tort is Saxton v. McDonnell Douglas Aircraft Co.," which addresses the question in terms of duty
and foreseeability. Plaintiff was the estate of Betty Kween, deceased. Betty Kween had herself been a plaintiff in a wrongful death action against the same two defendants, McDonnell Douglas and
General Dynamics, arising out of the "Paris Air Crash," a DC-10
accident occurring on March 3, 1974, and which resulted in the
deaths of Betty Kween's son and his wife. Betty Kween's case was
evidently the first Paris Air Crash case to proceed to trial. In early
1976 it resulted in a plaintiff's verdict in the amount of $1,509,950.00. On June 28, 1976, Betty Kween committed suicide. For its
claim arising out of her suicide, Betty Kween's estate set forth the
following theories of recovery: (1) products liability; (2) defendant's improper conduct toward Betty Kween in deposition and in
trial; and (3) improper use of the trial itself as a "test case," in that
defendants made an unreasonably low settlement offer. Defendants'
acts were said to have been willful and malicious, all leading to
Betty Kween's irresistible urge to commit suicide, a foreseeable
event within the risk of harm reasonably to be perceived by the
defendants.
On defendants' motion to dismiss for plaintiff's failure to state
a recognizable claim, the court first considered the scope of defendants' duty to decedent Betty Kween, relying heavily on the
8 id. at 942-43.
1 428 F. Supp. 1047 (C.D. Cal. 1977).
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case of Dillon v. Legg." The California Supreme Court in Dillon
v. Legg, dealing with liability for personal injury resulting from the
shock of a third person's death, and the court of appeals in
Archibald v. Braverman," dealing with the same subject, set forth
the following requirements for recovery: (1) a close relation
between plaintiff and the decedent; (2) "nearness" or proximity
to the fatal event; and (3) contemporaneous observance of the
event or its shocking aftermath. These factors were applied in
Krouse v. Graham,' to the effect that a prerequisite to liability
is a physical injury resulting from a "[d]irect emotional impact
from the sensory and contemporaneous observance of the accident,
as contrasted with learning of the accident from others after its
occurence."' The court then went on to hold as a matter of law
that Betty Kween's suicide failed to come within these requirements
and was simply too "remote and unexpected" to permit recovery,
and thereupon granted defendants' motions to dismiss with respect
to all theories of recovery.
Saxton v. McDonnell Douglas represents a reaffirmation of the
principle of Dillon v. Legg applied in a strict liability context.
That is, while it may not be necessary to establish negligence in
order to prevail against the manufacturer of a defective product,
it remains a requirement that the defendant manufacturer first
owe a duty to the plaintiff with respect to the plaintiff's harm. If
such harm would fall outside the risk in a negligence case, then it
is also outside the risk in a strict liability case.
11I. PILOTS' NEGLIGENCE
Aviation accident cases in which a pilot is either a plaintiff or
defendant are greatly influenced by ordinary negligence principles.
But unlike most ordinary negligence cases, the standard of care
to which a pilot is subject is codified at length in the Federal
Aviation Regulations (FARs)" promulgated by the Administrator
of the Federal Aviation Administration pursuant to the Federal
2068 Cal. 2d 728, 441 P.2d 912, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72 (1968).
11275 Cal. App. 2d 253, 79 Cal. Rptr. 723 (1969).
2157 Cal. App. 3d 752, 129 Cal. Rptr. 624 (1976).
257 Cal. App. 3d at 771, 129 Cal. Rptr. at 637.
24 14 C.F.R. §§ 61.1-.201, 91.1-99.49 (1977).

1978]

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

Aviation Act of 1958.' If a pilot is a plaintiff in either a products
liability action against a seller or in an ordinary negligence action
against, for instance, another pilot or an air traffic controller

(under the Federal Tort Claims Acte), or if a pilot is a defendant
in an ordinary negligence action arising out of an aircraft accident,
one of his most immediate concerns had better be his compliance,
or lack thereof, with all applicable FARs. Most FARs governing
aircraft operation are so specific that their violation can lead not
merely to a finding of a pilot's negligence, but to a holding that
the pilot was negligent per se, thereby precluding the issue of his
negligence as a matter of law.2 '
Several cases decided in 1977 involved the alleged negligent
failure of air traffic controllers to issue wake turbulence warnings
to pilots encountering wake turbulence.28 Two of them held the
pilots involved to be negligent per se by virtue of their operation
of the aircraft they were flying in violation of certain FARs,
thereby barring their recoveries altogether.
In Jenrette," plaintiff's decedent was the pilot of a Piper Cherokee, a light single engine general aviation aircraft, which encountered the wake of a Boeing 737, a twin-engine commercial
jet, and crashed as a result, allegedly because of the negligence of
an air traffic controller. The Boeing 737 was on final approach
to landing, ahead of and below the Cherokee. Weather conditions
were VFR.' Under such circumstances, the Boeing 737 had the
right of way over the Cherokee." In VFR conditions, it is the
2 Federal Aviation Act of 1958, 72 Stat. 731, as amended, 49 U.S.C. SS
1301 et seq. (1970), formerly Civil Aeronautics Act 1938, ch. 601, 52 Stat. 973.
U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1970).
See generally Gallagher & Stevens, General Aviation Pilots, Federal Aviation
Regulations, and Negligence Per Se, 19 FOR THE DEFENSE 195 (1978) [herein2628
27

after cited as Gallagher & Stevens].
21See, Jenrette v. United States, 14 Av. Cas. 17,798 (C.D. Cal. 1977); Kack
v. United States, 432 F. Supp. 633 (D.Minn. 1977); Dickens v. United States,
545 F.2d 886 (5th Cir. 1977); Neal v. United States, 562 F.2d 338 (5th Cir.
1977).
29
Jenrette v. United States, 14 Av. Cas. 17,798 (C.D. Cal. 1977).
"Visual Flight Rules (VFR) weather minimums are set forth in 14 C.F.R.
SS 91.105, 91.107 (1977).
21

14 C.F.R. S 91.67(f) (1977) provides:

(f) Landing. Aircraft, while on final approach to land, or while
landing, have the right of way over other aircraft in flight or operating on the surface. When two or more aircraft are approaching an
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legal obligation of the pilot of an aircraft to "see and avoid other
aircraft" and, if another aircraft has the right of way, "to give way
to that aircraft" and refrain from passing "over, under or ahead
of it, unless well clear."" The obligation imposed under this FAR
includes the obligation to avoid wake turbulence encounters with
other aircraft.' The court implicitly held that the decedent pilot had
violated 14 C.F.R. Section 91.67(a) in failing to avoid the Boeing
737's wake turbulence, and that violation of FAR's is negligence
as a matter of law. But the court did not dwell on this point, evidently because it also held the air traffic controller not to be
guilty of negligence in failing to issue a wake turbulence warning.
(A deficiency all too evident in opinions wrestling with FAR's is
the failure of court and counsel to fully articulate the negligence
per se argument, or to even cite the specific FAR involved. This
criticism is applicable to Jenrette.)
Another of the wake turbulence cases, Kack v. United States,
is likewise deficient in the articulation of its conclusion that the
crash of a light aircraft in VFR conditions was caused by the
pilot's negligence in failing to stay above the flight path of a preceding large aircraft on its final approach, and that the air traffic
controller was not negligent in failing to issue a wake turbulence
warning. The court could have based its conclusion on 14 C.F.R.
Section 91.67, but did not do so explicitly.
A recurrent theme in defense of pilots' suits against air traffic
controllers is that the pilot and not the air traffic controller "is
directly responsible for, and is the final authority as to, the operation of" his aircraft. This is the language of 14 C.F.R. Section 91.3
airport for the purpose of landing, the aircraft at the lower altitude

has the right of way, but it shall not take advantage of this rule to
cut in front of another which is on final approach to land, or to
overtake that aircraft.
"

14 C.F.R. § 91.67(a) (1977) provides:
(a) General. When weather conditions permit, regardless of whether
an operation is conducted under Instrument Flight Rules or Visual

Flight Rules, vigilance shall be maintained by each person operating an aircraft so as to see and avoid other aircraft in compliance
with this section. When a rule of this section gives another aircraft
the right of way, he shall give way to that aircraft and may not pass

over, under, or ahead of it, unless well clear.
"Wasilko v. United States, 300 F. Supp. 573 (N.D. Ohio 1967), aff'd, 412
F.2d 859 (6th Cir. 1969).
'4432 F. Supp. 633 (D. Minn. 1977).
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(a), and it was used in Kack, though without citation of its source.
(In fact, there was no explicit citation to any FAR in Kack.) This
particular regulation seems rarely to be the basis of a court's decision; it is usually added as additional justification for a conclusion
already reached by the court.
The remaining two wake turbulence cases, Dickens' and Neal,'
are ones in which the government was held liable for the negligence
of its air traffic controllers. Their conclusions appear superficially
to conflict with the conclusions of Jenrette and Kack, but they can
be reconciled without much difficulty. In Dickens, plaintiff's decedent was a passenger aboard an aircraft encountering wake turbulence generated by a Braniff jet, so he himself was not contributorily negligent. In order to deny his estate recovery, the court
would have to find either that there was no neglience on the part
of the air traffic controllers, or that the pilot's negligence was the
sole proximate cause of the crash. (The issue of the pilot's negligence, if any, was not addressed by the court). Another factor distinguishing Dickens is that the accident aircraft was not following
the Braniff jet on its approach but was approaching a runway
intersecting the runway upon which the Braniff jet had just landed.
Therefore, it was not the pilot's responsibility to maintain separation from the Braniff jet under 14 C.F.R. Section 91.67; it was the
air traffic controller's responsibility to maintain the necessary separation. Neal can also be reconciled with the other wake turbulence
cases in that the accident in Neal occurred under Instrument Flight
Rules (IFR) weather conditions, which is to say that the pilots
were unable to visually maintain separation and had to rely on
air traffic control.
The midair collision is another class of cases in which FAR's
play an important role. One such case decided in 1977, and denying recovery to pilots' estates on the ground that their violation of
certain FAR's was negligence per se, is Rudelson v. United States."
In this case, two of the plaintiffs were the estates of deceased pilots,
one operating a Cessna 150 and the other a Piper Colt. A midair collision between them occurred at 9:00 a.m. under VFR conditions, while both aircraft were on the downwind leg of the
," Dickens v. United States, 545 F.2d 886 (5th Cir. 1977).
'Neal v. United States, 562 F.2d 338 (5th Cir. 1977).
11431 F. Supp. 1101 (C.D. Cal. 1977).
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approach pattern for Runway 21 at the Santa Monica Airport.
A student pilot, Rudelson, was aboard the Cessna 150. The plaintiffs claimed that the Santa Monica tower controllers were negligent in failing to advise each aircraft of the other's proximity.
Under California's comparative negligence doctrine, 8 the court
held the United States to be twenty percent negligent, the Piper
pilot to be forty-five percent negligent, the Cessna pilot to be
twenty-five percent negligent, and Rudelson to be ten percent negligent. The pilots were held negligent per se for violating 14 C.F.R.
Sections 91.65(a),"9 91.67(a) " ' and 91.87(b). "1 Rudelson is significant because of its explicit holding that the violation of an
FAR is negligence per se and because of its lucid application of
the FAR's involved to the facts of this case. All the cases cited on
this subject are significant to the extent that they amount to a
judicial determination that specific FAR's satisfy the requirements
of the negligence per se doctrine.'
Three other 1977 cases holding that a pilot's violation of specific
FAR's is negligence per se are Wood v. United States,"' Todd v.
United States,' and Florida Freight Terminals, Inc. v. Cabanas."
In Wood, plaintiffs were the estates of the pilot and passengers
aboard a Piper Cherokee that crashed in IFR conditions about fifteen minutes after a VFR takeoff from Van Nuys, California. The
88

Li v. Yellow Cab Co., 13 Cal. 3d 804, 532 P.2d 1226, 119 Cal. Rptr. 858

(1975).
3914 C.F.R. § 91.65 (1977) provides:
(a) Operating near other aircraft. No person may operate an aircraft so close to another aircraft as to create a collision hazard.
4OSee note 32 supra.
41 14 C.F.R. S 91.87 (1977)
provides:
(b) Communications with control towers operated by the United

States. No person may, within an airport traffic area, operate an
aircraft to, from, or on an airport having a control tower operated
by the United States unless two-way radio communications are
maintained between that aircraft and the control tower. However,
if the aircraft radio fails in flight, he may operate that aircraft and
land if weather conditions are at or above basic VFR weather minimums, he maintains visual contact with the tower, and he receives
a clearance to land.

"For a complete discussion of the negligence per se doctrine as it applies to
FARS see Gallagher and Stephens, supra note 27.

"14

Av. Cas. 17,821 (C.D. Cal. 1977).

"384 F. Supp. 1284 (M.D. Fla. 1975), afg'd, 553 F.2d 384 (5th Cir. 1977).
14 Av. Cas. 18,335 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978).
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pilot was VFR-rated only, and was aware of the possibility of IFR
conditions along his proposed route because he had consulted the
local FAA Flight Service Station before departure. Even had he
not, he would be charged with knowledge of the weather conditions under 14 C.F.R. Section 91.5, which imposes the following
specific requirement of conduct on him: "Each pilot in command
shall, before beginning a flight, familiarize himself with all available
information concerning that flight. This information must include:
(a) for a flight under IFR or a flight not in the vicinity of an airport, weather reports and forecasts . . ." This VFR pilot, who
was prohibited from operating his aircraft in IFR conditions by
14 C.F.R. Section 61.3(e),' nevertheless elected to proceed with
the flight, deliberately entering IFR conditions. A crash resulted,
killing all aboard. The plaintiffs' theory of recovery is not clear
from the court's opinion, but the court disposed of the case on
defendant's Fed. R. Civ. P. 41 (b) motion for involuntary dismissal
by holding as a matter of law that the sole proximate cause of the
crash was the pilot's negligence. The pilot was held to be negligent
per se for violating 14 C.F.R. Section 61.3(e), prohibiting him
from flying in weather conditions below VFR minimums as set
forth in 14 C.F.R. Section 91.105.
The court also held that the pilot was negligent as a matter of
law (as opposed to negligent per se) for violating 14 C.F.R. Section 91.9, finding that the pilot and not air traffic control was ultimately and solely responsible for the operation of his aircraft under
14 C.F.R. Section 91.3 (a)." The prohibition of 14 C.F.R. Section
91.9 is that "[n]o person may operate an aircraft in a careless or
reckless manner so as to endanger the life or property of another."
Since this FAR does not impose a specific requirement of conduct,
its violation cannot be negligence per se. But where the facts are
such, as here, that reasonable minds could reach no conclusion
4 14 C.F.R. § 61.3(e) (1977), Instrument Rating, provides:
No person may act as pilot in command of a civil aircraft under
instrument flight rules, or in weather conditions less than the minimums prescribed for VFR flight [in 14 C.F.R. Sections 91.105 and

91.107] unless-(1) in the case of an airplane, he holds an instrument rating.
47 14 C.F.R. § 91.3 (1977), Responsibility and authority of the pilot in command, provides:
(a) The pilot in command of an aircraft is directly responsible

for, and is the final authority as to, the operation of that aircraft.
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other than that the pilot's conduct was "careless or reckless," then
violation of the regulation can be held negligence as a matter
of law.
Todd v. United States" is another case in which a pilot's failure
to familiarize himself with all available information concerning
his flight, in violation of 14 C.F.R. Section 91.5, was held negligence per se barring his estate from any recovery to which it might
otherwise be entitled. The decedent, an instrument rated pilot, commenced his descent for landing in severe IFR conditions, in known
mountainous terrain, without having familiarized himself with
the terrain features, and crashed into a mountain. The court held
that while the United States was also negligent in certain particulars, the pilot's per se negligence precluded any recovery.
And finally, the most recent case, Florida Freight Terminals,
Inc. v. Cabanas,"9 held that failure to tie down or secure a cargo
is a violation of the FAR's and constitutes negligence per se.
These cases, taken together, have a significance beyond their
individual facts, demonstrating that the Federal Aviation Regulations are an extremely potent weapon directed at pilots involved
in aircraft accidents. In fact, it probably is not an overstatement
to say that in virtually every aviation accident case, the FAR's
can be made to play a substantial role by an attorney familiar with
them and the related case law.
IV.

AIR CARRIERS' LIABILITY TO PASSENGERS

The cases discussed under this heading are concerned with air
carriers' liability to passengers under contracts of carriage, including applicable tariffs, and the Warsaw Convention. The Warsaw
Convention governs claims arising out of international air carrier
operations, and some of the 1977 cases construing it will be discussed first.
Reed v. Wiser' is a case arising out of the crash at sea of TWA
Flight 841 bound from Tel Aviv to New York on September 8,
1974. Under Article 22 of the Warsaw Convention, TWA would
be absolutely liable for the deaths of the passengers aboard Flight
48 384 F. Supp. 1284 (M.D. Fla. 1975), aff'd, 553 F.2d 384 (5th Cir. 1977).
"' 14 Av. Cas. 18,335 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978).
90555 F.2d 1079 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, U.S. -,
98 S. Ct. 399
(1977) noted, 44 J. Air L. & Com. 175 (1978).
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841, but in an amount limited to $75,000 per passenger absent
a showing of willful misconduct Instead of suing TWA, however,
the plaintiffs sued various corporate officers individually, alleging
that they negligently failed to prevent the placing on Flight 841 of
a bomb which, upon exploding, caused the crash. Defendants
raised as a defense the liability limitation of Article 22 and the
plaintiffs' motion to strike the defense was granted. The trial court
certified to the Second Circuit Court of Appeals the question
whether the liability limits of Article 22 applied to actions against
individual officers and employees of an air carrier. The court of
appeals observed first that there was a conflict among decisions
at the district court level, and then proceeded to consider the
arguments advanced in favor of affirming the trial court's decision.
One of those arguments was that the United States had not
ratified the Hague Protocol of 1955, which, inter alia, expressly
stated that the liability limits applied to a carrier's servants and
agents. The court disposed of this argument by saying:
We believe this reliance [on the refusal of the United States to
ratify the Hague Protocol] on the part of the district court to be
misplaced, since the refusal to ratify the Protocol was due to the
United States' dissatisfaction with an entirely different aspect of
the Protocol-its failure to provide a sufficient increase in the
liability limits-rather than to its application of these limits to
a carrier's employees."
The court concluded that the purpose of Article 22 was to fix at a
definite level the cost to airlines of damages sustained by their
passengers and of insurance to cover such damages. In overturning
the lower court's decision, the court said,
The district court's decision, forsaking one uniform rule governing
the limits of employee liability, would raise the very real prospect
that in future international air disaster cases the plaintiffs would
seek to circumvent the Convention's limitation by bringing suit
against the pilot or some other employee of the airline involved,
thus requiring the court to determine what domestic law applies
and whether under that law recovery might be had for an amount
greater than that recoverable against the airline. Indeed, in one
lawsuit just commenced in New York seeking $4.5 million for the
death of a passenger killed in the recent collision of two Boeing
747 planes in the Canary Islands, the plaintiffs have taken the cue
1

555 F.2d at 1086.
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from the district court's decision here and joined one of the pilots
as a codefendant. If this method of circumventing the Convention's
liability limitation is accepted, not only will the purpose of defining the limits of the carrier's obligations be circumvented, but in
the process the Convention's most fundamental objective of providing a uniform system of liability and litigation rules for international air disasters will be abandoned as well. It is difficult to
imagine an interpretation more at odds with the acknowledged
purposes of the Convention than that for which appellees press."
The significance of this decision is apparent. A federal court of
appeals has now held that the liability limitations of the Warsaw
Convention apply to employees of air carriers as well as to the
air carriers themselves, thereby preventing the circumvention of
the limitation by suing airline employees directly. The court aptly
observed that the Warsaw Convention is the supreme law of the
land, and that any modification of its application or effect is preeminently a matter for the executive and legislative branches of
government, not for the courts.
Another significant Warsaw Convention case is Karfunkel v.
Compagnie Nationale Air France," which arose in New York from
the hijacking of an Air France flight enroute from Tel Aviv to
Paris, and its diversion to Entebbe Airport in Uganda, where its
passengers and crew were later rescued in a military operation
mounted by Israeli forces. Plaintiffs' claim was for bodily injury
and false imprisonment, and was founded on diversity of citizenship. Air France raised three affirmative defenses based on the
Warsaw Convention, and moved the court to dismiss the claim
against it for lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter. Plaintiffs
moved to strike the affirmative defenses. The issue before the
court was basically jurisdictional: was plaintiffs' claim cognizable
under the Warsaw Convention? If so, then jurisdiction would be
proper only in France or Israel, under Article 24 of the Convention. The court held it was and dismissed the action against Air
France.
Article 17 of the Convention imposes liability on an air carrier
for "bodily injury" to a passenger if an "accident" causes damage
to him aboard the aircraft. On the basis of previously decided
"id. at 1092.
"14 Av. Cas. 17,674 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
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authorities, the court first held that the "hijacking" was an "accident" within the meaning of Article 17, and then turned to the
question of whether a claim for false imprisonment came within
the meaning of "bodily injury." Plaintiffs, argued that mental anguish is not specifically included in the language of Article 17 and
thus could not be the basis for any claim based on the Convention.
The court rejected the argument, observing that the Warsaw Convention does not create claims for relief but merely establishes
procedural rules governing substantive claims created by local law,
and cited in support New York and California district court
authority. The court acknowledged that other trial courts had
reached a contrary result, but preferred the reasoning that "[a]ll
claims for damages for personal injuries suffered by a passenger
in an 'accident,' whether physical or mental, be resolved in one
action under the Convention."'
Plaintiffs also argued that their action was exempt from the Warsaw Convention under its Article 34, which provides that "[t]his
convention shall not apply . . . to transportation performed in
extraordinary circumstances outside the normal scope of an air
carrier's business." While this argument had superficial plausibility
to commend it, the court concluded that the diversion by hijacking
of a flight commenced in the ordinary course of business could
not amount to such extraordinary circumstances as are contemplated by Article 34. The court said, "Article 34 was not intended
to exclude from the Convention any regularly scheduled flight on
which an abnormal event prevents completion; such a construction
would render the Convention meaningless."'
A state court trial level case decided in 1977 interpreting Article
17 is Beck v. KLM Royal Dutch Airlines." Plaintiff there alleged
psychic trauma only, without an accompanying bodily injury claim.
The court granted the airlines' motion for summary judgment, and
based on existing New York authority, held that "[w]ithin the
meaning of this Treaty, a solely psychic trauma is not 'bodily' injury." 7' This case is not inconsistent with Karfunkel v. Air France
for the reason that there was no physical injury claim made here
54Id.

at 17,678.

[Id.

14 Av. Cas. 18,210 (N.Y. 1977).
57Id. at 18,211 (emphasis added).
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as there was in Karfunkel. There was therefore no need to consider
any separation of claims such as would have resulted in Karfunkel
had the court held that mental anguish was not bodily injury within
Article 17. In many states, of course, a psychic injury can be a
cognizable claim only if accompanied by physical injury, and
perhaps Karfunkel and Beck can be reconciled on this basis as
well.
Two other Warsaw Convention cases are of interest. These are
Maugnie v. Compagnie Nationale Air France" and Evangelinos v.
Trans World Airlines" which deal with the meaning of "disembarkation" and "embarkation," respectively.
The court in Maugnie held that an Air France passenger who
had deplaned and had proceeded through a common passenger
corridor to board another air carrier's flight had completed disembarkation of the Air France flight within Article 17 of the Warsaw Convention. On this basis, the court affirmed the dismissal
of plaintiff's claim for bodily injury sustained in a slip and fall
in the common corridor.
Evangelinos held that TWA passengers assembled in TWA's
transit lounge in Athens, Greece preparatory to boarding its Flight
881 to New York were in the process of embarking when terrorists
suddenly attacked them, and reversed the partial summary judgment entered by the trial court dismissing plaintiff's claim under
Article 17 of the Warsaw Convention.
Three rather routine air carrier cases not involving the Warsaw
Convention are worthy of brief mention here. The first is Delta
Air Lines v. Isaacs." Plaintiff Isaacs made a lost baggage claim
of $750 against defendant Delta Air Lines, which denied the
claim. Isaacs then brought suit to recover the $750 plus punitive
damages and attorney's fees. The basis of plaintiff's claim for
punitive damages and attorney's fees was Delta's alleged willful
and unwarranted obstinance in dealing with his claim. The court
refused to charge the jury that Delta's total liaiblity was limited
to $500 by its Tariff No. PR-6, Section 370-A, purporting to so
limit its liability for lost baggage. (Air carrier tariffs duly filed
with the Civil Aeronautics Board have the force and effect of law,
"1 14 Av. Cas. 17,534 (9th Cir. 1977).
9 550 F.2d 152 (3rd Cir. 1977).
141 Ga. App. 209, 233 S.E.2d 212 (1977).
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and are not merely part of the contract of carriage. 1 ) The jury
returned a verdict for Isaacs awarding $500 actual damages,
$750 punitive damages and $500 for attorney's fees. On Delta's
appeal, the court of appeals held that it was not error for the trial
court to refuse to charge that Delta's total liability was limited to
$500, for the reason that while plaintiff's claim based on Delta's
breach of its bailment contract was limited by the applicable tariff,
plaintiff's claim based on Delta's conduct toward him following the
loss was an independent action not subject to the tariff. The court
then held that the award for attorney's fees was proper but that
the award for punitive damages could not be sustained because
no compensatory damages for Delta's conduct had been awarded.
Under Georgia law, punitive damages must be predicated on an
award of compensatory damages,.
Another baggage loss case is Nylen v. Delta Air Lines, 2 in
which plaintiff was a passenger on one of defendant's flights. Upon
arrival at his destination, plaintiff was unable to locate his baggage and immediately notified defendant of its loss. Plaintiff completed a lost baggage report form presented to him by defendant
and returned it to defendant's agent, apparently thinking that he
had done whatever it was necessary to do to protect his interests.
When after several months, plaintiff's luggage still had not been
found, he sought reimbusement from the company for his loss.
His claim was denied on the ground that he had not made a claim
for his loss within the forty-five day period prescribed in Tariff No.
PR-6 (Rule 40-B) for such losses. That is, the form he had prepared at the time of his loss was said to be nothing more than a "notice
of loss" and was not a "notice of claim" within the meaning of the
tariff. On the reverse side of the form was the following: "[This]
report alone does not constitute a claim.... Industry tariffs require
that you protect the validity of this loss or damage report by writing a letter of claims to the company within 45 days." The court
viewed the issue before it as one of the "reasonableness" of the two
step claim procedure. The court distinguished cases suggesting that
the issue should be resolved in favor of the traveler, saying:
61See, e.g., Blair v. Delta Airlines, 344 F. Supp. 360 (S.D. Fla. 1972), aff'd,
447 F.2d 564 (5th Cir. 1973).

42 14 Av. Cas. 17,927 (Mass. Dist. Ct. 1977).
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[N]otwithstanding this body of precedent, if there is a rational
purpose for the procedures established by Delta and if adequate
steps are taken to insure that the public, with even a modicum of
vigilance, may be apprised of these procedures, then the procedure at issue should not be lightly set aside."
Delta's avowed purpose for the procedure was to give it an opportunity to investigate in the event lost baggage did not appear shortly
(i.e., within seven days) after the flight (as it usually does). The
court held this purpose to be rational, and then held that Delta's
"notice of loss" form sufficiently apprised plaintiff of the claim
procedure to be followed in the event his baggage was not recovered within seven days. The court thereupon affirmed the trial
court's judgment for Delta. Since air carrier tariffs have the force
of federal law, they operate to supplant contrary local laws-this
particular tariff had the effect of imposing a forty-five day "statute
of limitations" on lost or damaged baggage claims as well as a twotiered claim procedure.
Tait v. Steinbugleri' is a case concerned with the extent of an
air carrier's duty to protect its passengers from assaults by fellow
passengers. While a passenger on an Allegheny Airlines flight,
plaintiff was threatened with assault by a fellow passenger (Steinbugler). Plaintiff informed Allegheny of Steinbugler's threat, and
was in fact assaulted by Steinbugler in the airport parking lot after
disembarking from the aircraft. On defendant Allegheny's motion
to dismiss, plaintiff argued that whether Allegheny's duty to him
extended to protecting him from assault in a parking lot which
it did not own was a question of fact for the jury. The court disagreed, saying that while an air carrier has a duty to transport its
passengers to their terminus and to furnish a safe place to alight
and a safe means of egress, it would be an unwarranted imposition
as a matter of law to oblige Allegheny to patrol a parking lot it
does not own. The court granted Allegheny's motion on this basis."
V. AIR

CARRIERS' LIABILITY TO PASSENGERS FOR "OVERBOOKING"

On April 28, 1972, Ralph Nader was denied boarding on an
-Allegheny Airlines flight for which he held a confirmed reservation.
63 Id.

at 17,930.

"414 Av. Cas. 17,865 (S.D.N.Y.

1977).
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The boarding denial resulted from Allegheny's practice of "overbooking" its flights in anticipation of confirmed reservation "noshows." The amount by which Allegheny (and other airlines)
overbooked its flights was determined on a statistical basis. In 1973,
Nader and the Connecticut Citizens Action Group (CCAG), allegedly damaged as a result of Nader's delayed arrival at his destination, filed an action against Allegheny, claiming intentional misrepresentation and seeking compensatory and punitive damages."
The court awarded Nader $10.00 in compensatory damages and
$25,000 in punitive damages, and awarded the CCAG $51.00
in compensatory damages and $25,000 in punitive damages. On
appeal, the court reversed and remanded on the basis that the case
should be stayed until the CAB could administratively determine
whether Allegheny's overbooking practice was deceptive, that the
CCAG had no standing, and that before awarding punitive damages, the trial court should have found that Allegheny was acting
in bad faith when it denied Nader his confirmed seat."' Nader was
granted certiorari to the United States Supreme Court which reversed the court of appeals, saying that Nader's federal court action need not be stayed pending an administrative determination
by the CAB, and ordering the trial court to determine whether
Allegheny had acted in good faith." In January, 1978, the trial
judge (Charles Richey) awarded Nader $15,000 in compensatory
and punitive damages and found that Allegheny's overbooking
practice was fraudulent and wanton." The judge found that Allegheny violated the non-discrimination provision of the Federal
Aviation Act (49 U.S.C. Section 1374(b)) and that its failure to
disclose its overbooking practices was a fraudulent misrepresentation of the meaning of "confirmed reservations." No award was entered for the CCAG, as the court of appeals ruling that it had no
standing had not been disturbed by the Supreme Court."0
Another alleged overbooking case is Burke v. Eastern Airlines,
6Cf.
Maugnie v. Cie. National Air France, 14 Av. Cas. 17,534 (9th Cir.
1977).
" Nader v. Allegheny Airlines, 365 F. Supp. 128 (D.D.C. 1973).
"7Nader v. Allegheny Airlines, 512 F.2d 527 (D.C. Cir. 1975), ev'd on other
grounds, 426 U.S. 290 (1976).
68Nader v. Allegheny Airlines, 426 U.S. 290 (1976).
'
[1978] Av. L. REP. (CCH) 5 18,312 (D.D.C. 1978).
70Id.
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Inc. 1 Plaintiffs brought their actions under Section 404(b) of
the Federal Aviation Act'2 in which they alleged that they had
confirmed reservations on one of defendant's flights, that their
flight had been "overbooked," that defendant had fraudulently
represented to them that they had confirmed seats, and that defendant was negligent in operating its computerized reservation
system. Plaintiffs asserted "federal question" jurisdiction under 28
U.S.C. Section 1331 and jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. Section
1337, which confers federal jurisdiction over any action arising
under an Act of Congress regulating commerce. Defendant Eastern Airlines moved to dismiss the action for lack of jurisdiction.
The court first observed that an implied private right of action
exists under 49 U.S.C. Section 1374(b) for an air carrier's unreasonable prejudice or unjust discrimination against any person, but
went on to say that the overbooking practice itself is not per se
actionable under Section 1374(b). It is only when the air carrier
has violated its own prima facie non-discriminatory priority rules
that an action under Section 1374(b) arises. Thus, the following
allegations are necessary and sufficient to invoke jurisdiction under
Section 1374(b): (1) plaintiff possessed confirmed reservation;
(2) plaintiff was entitled to a designated priority under the carrier's rules as approved by the CAB; and (3) the carrier boarded
persons with lower priority.
Defendant Eastern's motion to dismiss went not to the sufficiency
of plaintiffs' jurisdictional allegations, but to the impossibility of
proving that they indeed had confirmed reservations, and was therefore more in the nature of a partial motion for summary judgment
than a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
Under Rule 60(j) of CAB General Tariff No. 142, a space "on
a given flight is [confirmed] when the availability and allocation
of such space is confirmed by a reservations agent of the carrier
and entered into the carrier's electronic reservations system."
71 14 Av. Cas. 17,776 (N.D. Ga. 1977).
provides:
7249 U.S.C. S 1374(b) (1970)
No air carrier or foreign carrier shall make, give, or cause any

undue or unreasonable preference or advantage to any particular
person, port, locality, or description of traffic in air transportation
in any respect whatsoever or subject any particular person, port,
locality, or description of traffic in air transportation to any unjust
discrimination or any undue or unreasonable prejudice or disad-

vantage in any respect whatsoever.
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Eastern introduced computerized business records establishing that
plaintiffs did not hold confirmed reservations on the subject flight,
and were therefore entitled to no boarding priority whatever. Plaintiffs ineffectively attempted to controvert Eastern's records, and
the court granted Eastern's motion to dismiss. Plaintiffs' remaining
claims were common law claims not alone cognizable in a federal
court, and they were dismissed as well.
Joining Nader in victory was Mr. Smith in the most recently
reported case of Smith v. Piedmont Aviation, Inc."3 The court found
that the air carrier's boarding passengers on a first-come-first-serve
basis when its own published priority rule provided for a date-ofbooking basis constituted unreasonable discrimination and supported compensatory damages. The court found, however, that
the carrier's conduct did not warrant punitive damages.
In Wilensky v. Olympic Airways," plaintiffs sought to maintain
a class action under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) ' and 23(b) (3)" on behalf of a class of 2,083 persons who held confirmed reservations but
were denied passage because of lack of space on Olympic Airways
flights from New York to Athens, Greece during the period from
February 21, 1973 through February 19, 1975, into which class
plaintiffs fell. Defendant opposed class action certification.
73[1978] 3 Av. L. Rep. (CCH) 5J18,327 (5th Cir. 1978).
7"14 Av. Cas. 18,034 (E.D. Pa. 1977).

' Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) provides:
Prerequisites to a Class Action. One or more members of a class
may sue or be sued as representative parties on behalf of all only

if (1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable, (2) the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class, and (4) the
representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests
of the class.
76Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b) provides:

(3) The court finds that the questions of law or fact common to
the members of the class predominate over any questions affecting only individual members, and that a class action is superior to
other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of
the controversy. The matters pertinent to the findings include:
(A) the interest of members of the class in individually controlling the prosecution or defense of separate actions; (B) the extent
and nature of any litigation concerning the controversy already
commenced by or against members of the class; (C) the desirability or undesirability of concentrating the litigation of the claims
in the particular forum; (D) the difficulties likely to be encountered in the management of a class action. (Emphasis added)
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Count I of plaintiffs' complaint alleged violation of 49 U.S.C.
1374(b), ' Count II alleged breach of the contract of carriage,
and Count III alleged fraudulent misrepresentation. Punitive damages were sought as well.
The court applied the requirements of Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)
and 23(b) (3) to all three counts of the complaint, and denied
class action certification. With respect to Count I, the court held
that it would have to make a determination in each individual case
of whether the defendant followed its own priority rules in denying
boarding before it could conclude that individual had been discriminated against under 49 U.S.C. Section 1374(b). As a result,
the court could not find the existence of common questions of law
and fact under Rule 23 (a). Further, the court held that even if Rule
23 (a) could be satisfied, the "predominance requirement" of Rule
23(b) (3) could not be satisfied, for any common questions were
clearly subordinate to the questions of fact entailed in the necessary
individual inquiries.
Similarly, with respect to Counts II and III, the court held that
individual inquiries were necessitated, and that they predominated
over common questions. For instance, in Count III (fraudulent
misrepresentation) it would be necessary to determine whether
each member of the class had relied on the representation, and it
would be necessary to determine just what was the substance of
the representation, if any, made to each member of the class. Likewise with respect to the claim for punitive damages, it would be
necessary to establish that defendant's conduct toward each individual in the class was activiated by malice or evil motive. Accordingly, the court denied class action certification.
VI. THE NECESSITY OF A CAUSAL RELATION BETWEEN
EXCLUSIONS IN AVIATION INSURANCE POLICIES AND
A CLAIMED Loss FOR WHICH COVERAGE IS DENIED

South CarolinaInsurance Co. v. Collins" was a declaratory judgment action arising out of the crash of an aircraft piloted by one
Metz Collins, defendant's decedent, in which a passenger, Wesley
Nesbitt, was injured. Nesbitt brought a personal injury action
against Collins' estate. South Carolina Insurance Company, which
" See note 72 supra.
78237 S.E.2d 358 (S.C. 1977).
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insured Collins under an aircraft liability policy, refused the defense of Nesbitt's action on the ground that at the time of the accident, Collins was not covered because his medical certificate had
expired. Paragraph 7 of the policy declarations provided that
Collins could operate the aircraft only if he had valid and effective
pilot and medical certificates. Paragraph 25 of the policy conditions recited that the policy declarations were representations made
by Collins and that the policy was issued in reliance on them.
The South Carolina Insurance Company's declaratory judgment
action sought a determination that there was no coverage for the
accident under the policy. For purposes of the declaratory judgment action only, it was stipulated that there was no causal relation between the crash and Collins' failure to have an effective
medical certificate. Although there was no South Carolina authority
on point relative to aviation liability insurance policies, the South
Carolina Supreme Court concluded that a line of cases dealing
with automobile liability and life insurance policies was dispositive
of the issue before it. Since that line of cases required that a causal
connection be established, and since none was, the court affirmed
the trial court's order that coverage attached.
One of the cases relied upon by the South Carolina Supreme
Court" involved a life insurance policy providing that "[t]his policy
does not cover . . . loss sustained by the insured . . . while committing some act in violation of law." The insured was killed while
riding on the running board of a truck in violation of a city ordinance, but defendant had shown no causal connection between that
fact and the insured's death. The court held that in order to avoid
coverage, the insurer was required to show such a causal connection, and thereupon reversed the granting of a directed verdict for
the defendant insurer on that basis.
The insurer's position in these cases is that the ambit of the risk
for which coverage is provided is defined by the terms and conditions of the policy. If the total risk inherent in a given activity for
which there would otherwise be coverage exceeds or is outside
the scope of the risk defined by the policy, then by the very provisions of the policy, there is simply no coverage in the first instance. This, it is argued, should be true regardless of whether
7

9 Reynolds v. Life & Cas. Ins. Co., 166 S.C. 214, 164 S.E. 602 (1932).
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the particular risk which actually causes the loss would, standing
alone, come within the risk defined by the policy. A corollary to
this argument is that the insured, by engaging in risk-generating
activity outside the risk defined by his policy, is simply outside the
scope of its coverage. If a pilot wants insurance coverage for, say,
operating an aircraft for which he is not rated or without a current medical certificate, he must expect to pay a premium commensurate with the totality of the risk and if he proceeds to operate
an aircraft without first having obtained such coverage, he should
not be heard later to complain. This is all simply to say that the
question of coverage vel non should be one capable of determination at the outset of the activity, and not one to be determined
only after a loss has occurred.
A case articulating this point of view well is Insurance Co. of
North America v. Lympal, Inc.,,* a declaratory judgment action
addressing precisely the same issue as that in South CarolinaInsurance Co. v. Collins. In holding that the insured pilot's failure
to have a current medical certificate as required under the terms
of the insurance policy barred coverage, irrespective of a causal
relation between such failure and the crash, the court quoted
approvingly from Baker v. Insurance Co. of North America1 as
follows:
An insurance policy is a contract. In this one the parties expressly
'agreed that coverage provided by this policy with respect to any
aircraft specifically and individually described therein shall not
apply while such aircraft is in flight unless the pilot in command
of the aircraft is properly certificated . . .' The clear meaning of
this language is not that the risk is excluded if damage to the aircraft is CA USED by a failure of the pilot to be properly certificated but that risk is excluded if damage occurs WHILE the air2
craft is being flown by a pilot not properly certificated."
The court then said, referring to Baker, "[Baker] went on to hold
that the failure to comply with the Federal Regulations need not
be the cause of the crash, but simply under the clear terms of
the exclusion coverage simply did not exist."'"
60

[1978] 3 Av. L. REP. (CCH) 5 18,067 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1977).

10 N.C. App. 605, 179 S.E.2d 892 (1971).
at 894 (emphasis added).
83Id.
"1

82 Id.
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A case consistent with Insurance Co. of North America v.
Lynpal is Macalco, Inc. v. Gulf Insurance Co.," a declaratory
judgment action in which the defendant denied liability coverage
for an aircraft crash under the following exclusion: "This policy
does not apply .. while the aircraft is in flight and. . . operated
by a student pilot unless such flight. . is with the specific advance
approval of and under the supervision and control of an FAA
Certificated Commercial Instructor Pilot." At the time of the crash,
the aircraft involved was being operated by a student pilot in
violation of the above exclusion. The trial court decided against
Gulf on several grounds, one of which was a lack of causal connection between the fact that the pilot was a student pilot and the
happening of the crash. On appeal, the trial court was reversed.
With respect to the "causal connection" requirement, the court
said,
Courts of high authority have held that in policies (phrased to
exclude certain activities) there is no need of any causal nexus
between the injury or death and the forbidden forms of conduct.
While the proscribed activity continues, the insurance is suspended
as if it had never been in force.
The contract terms govern with no need to show some additional
element ... and such remains the rule so long as the exclusion is
plain and unambiguous.
In aircraft insurance cases, many jurisdictions have expressly rejected any causation requirement while enforcing excluded uses. 5
The Macalco court, in a lengthy opinion, comprehensively discusses the effect to be given exclusions in aviation liability policies,
and their construction with other provisions in the policy. It is
well worth reading.
With this, we have completed the discussion of 1977 aviation
cases falling into easily definable subject matter areas. There remain to be considered, however, a few cases which may be of
more limited interest and of a miscellaneous nature.
VII. MISCELLANEOUS CASES

Virtually every aviation accident is investigated by either the
" 550 S.W.2d 883 (Mo. App. 1977).

Oid. at 892 (citations omitted; emphasis added).
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National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) or the FAA. The
NTSB investigates principally fatal aviation accidents. In every
case, an official investigation report is prepared. If a particular
accident leads to litigation, the question of the limits on use of
the official accident report naturally arises. Resolution of the question is not nearly so simple as one might suppose. A preliminary
distinction must be made between the factual accident investigation report and the NTSB's probable cause report, for NTSB rules"
permit its investigators to testify with respect to their factual report,
but not with respect to the Board's probable cause report. This is
to say that an NTSB investigator cannot give opinion or expert
testimony. The same is generally true with respect to FAA investigators as well. These prohibitions apply regardless of whether the
investigator's testimony is taken for discovery or trial purposes."
A 1977 case concerned with the use of an FAA accident report
is Roberts v. Morey Airplane Co." At issue was defendant's motion in limine to exclude from plaintiff's evidence a series of four
FAA accident reports. Relying on the statutory section governing
use of NTSB reports," the court granted the defendant's motion.
It is arguable that the court's reliance on 49 U.S.C. Section 1441
(e) was misplaced, because an FAA report is not an NTSB report
and there is no comparable statute expressly precluding the introduction of FAA reports into evidence. However, FAA accident investigations are made at the request and on behalf of the NTSB,
and it seems sound they should be clothed with the same protection afforded NTSB reports. Since the four reports appeared to
relate to other accidents, a sounder basis for exclusion would be
immateriality, and Section 1441 (e) may be of questionable applicability since it refers to the admissibility of reports in actions grow8614 C.F.R. §§ 835.1-835.9, issued pursuant to 49 U.S.C. § 1441(e) (1970),
providing:

No part of any report or reports of the National Transportation
Safety Board relating to any accident or the investigation thereof,
shall be admitted as evidence or used in any suit or action for damages growing out of any matter mentioned in such report or re87
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ports.
14 C.F.R. S 9.1-.17 (1977); 49 U.S.C. S 1657 (1970).
Kline v. Martin, 345 F. Supp. 31, 32 (E.D. Va. 1972).
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ing out of matters mentioned in such reports.91
One of the many important documents in aircraft litigation is
the airframe log book, which reflects maintenance, repairs, and
compliance with 100 hour and annual inspection requirements.
An aircraft may not be operated except in accordance with the
requirements of all applicable airworthiness directives, ' which set
forth procedures to be followed to remedy an "unsafe condition"
in an aircraft." In United States v. Airways Service, Inc.,' a district court held that "compliance with A.D.'s [airworthiness directives] must be set out explicitly [in the airframe log book] rather
than subsumed into a 100 hour or other inspection."" It is the
routine of many aircraft service and repair shops to state in a
conclusory manner that all airworthiness directives through a particular number have been complied with in conjunction with a log
book entry reflecting performance of a 100 hour inspection and a
certification that the aircraft is airworthy. United States imposes a
greater duty.
The last case to be discussed here is San Diego Unified Port
District v.Superior Court." In an underlying "inverse condemnation" case against the San Diego Port District, some homeowners
sought recovery on theories of nuisance, negligence, and trespass.
among others, alleging damage done by the noise of aircraft operations at San Diego International Airport. The state trial court
overruled San Diego's general demurrer, and San Diego petitioned
for a preemptory writ in the court of appeals. The court of appeals
denied the petition, observing that the allegations in the complaint were sufficiently broad to state a cause of action. The court
ordered, however, that any recovery be limited to those damages
arising out of the operation of the airport itself, and not include
any recovery for damages caused by aircraft in flight. The court's
reasoning on this point was that the field of aircraft noise regulation had been preempted by the federal government, and that
O"See note 86, supra.
92
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§ 39.3 (1977).

9314 C.F.R. § 39.1 (1977).
9429 F. Supp. 843 (N.D. Iowa 1977).
9Id. at 846 (emphasis added).
967 Cal. App. 3d 361, 136 Cal. Rptr. 557 (1977), cert. denied,
98 S.Ct. 184 (1977).
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flights complying with federal laws and regulations (as the subject
flights evidently did) could not be classified as constituting negligence, nuisance or trespass; in contrast, the alleged tortious man-

agement of the airport facilities themselves was a stated cause of
action that had not been preempted by federal law. Contrast Morris
v. Ciborowski," where recovery of damages for overflights as well
as for management of the airport was permitted."
VIII. CONCLUSION

At the outset of this paper, the reader was cautioned not to expect to be educated in depth. We have intended to acquaint the
attorney having some interest in aviation matters with areas of
activity in federal and state courts in 1977. One subject we avoided,
partly because of its specialized character and partly because of
the volume of material involved, was the litigation between British
Airways and Air France on one side, and the Port Authority of
New York and New Jersey on the other, arising out of the refusal
of the Port Authority to permit test flights of the Concorde supersonic airliner to and from John F. Kennedy International Airport
after such flights had been federally approved. For those interested
in tracing the course of this litigation, see British Airways v. Port
Authortiy of New York & New Jersey."

97 113 N.H. 563, 311 A.2d 296 (1973).

"See generally Annot., 79 A.L.R.3d 253 (1977).
"' British Airways v. Port Auth. of N.Y. & N.J., 431 F. Supp. 1216 (S.D.N.Y.
1977), rev'd, 558 F.2d 75 (2d Cir. 1977), on remand, 437 F. Supp. 80
(S.D.N.Y. 1977), aff'd & modified, 564 F.2d 1002 (2d Cir. 1977).

